there are two distinct attitudes within feminist thought to the phenomenon of political violence.
In this essay, Hutchings contends that Simone de Beauvoir's argument in the Ethics of Ambiguity provides a valuable resource for feminists currently addressing the question of the legitimacy of political violence, whether of the state or otherwise. The reason is not that Beauvoir provides a definitive answer to this question, but rather because of the ways in which she deconstructs it. In enabling her reader to appreciate what is presupposed by a resistant politics that adopts violence as its instrument, Beauvoir illuminates the problems encountered by the kinds of "realistic and positive" and "idealistic and moral" arguments through which the use of violence in politics is routinely justified. At the same time, Beauvoir demonstrates that to deconstruct the question of the legitimacy of violence is neither to banish nor resolve it. She does not offer a recipe for determining the legitimacy or otherwise of the use of violence in politics in general; instead, she illuminates the irremediable difficulty and inescapability of such judgments in a violent and intransigent world.
there are two distinct attitudes within feminist thought to the phenomenon of political violence.
1 Both attitudes view the use of violence as a political instrument as deplorable. However, the first, while suspicious of political violence in general, nevertheless makes a distinction, on feminist grounds, between oppressive (often, but not always, state-based) violence and violence that resists oppression. this allows for ethical discrimination between different types of violence, and therefore opens up the possibility that the use of political violence, however deplorable, may be justified in certain (highly restricted) circumstances.
2 the second attitude rejects the idea that it is possible to distinguish between oppressive and antioppressive violence from a feminist point of view, and therefore classifies all uses of political violence as equally deplorable. Hypatia vol. 22, no. 3 (Summer 2007 ) © by Kimberly Hutchings it argues that only a pacifist ethic is compatible with feminist politics.
3 Feminist judgments of actual instances of political violence, whether in wars, humanitarian interventions, revolutionary or liberationist struggles, or indeed terrorist acts, manifest both of these attitudes. Sometimes feminists condemn violence because of how it is being used or what it is being used for; sometimes feminists condemn violence for the practice itself, regardless of the particular circumstances; frequently, a combination of these arguments is deployed. Very often, these different arguments point to the same evaluative conclusion in relation to a particular instance of violence. yet, however much these arguments may seem to be mutually reinforcing, a deep tension exists between them. to censure a specific use of violence because of the particular characteristics of that use is not the same as censuring all violence as oppressive per se. in drawing on both kinds of argument, feminist responses to political violence are fundamentally ambiguous, which is reflected in the fact that although most feminists are highly critical of political violence, few are committed to absolute pacifism.
i seek here to explore this tension in feminist thought through the examination of Beauvoir's Ethics of Ambiguity (1948 Ambiguity ( /1997 . in this text, we find a feminist thinker engaging questions of the ethics of revolutionary violence as well as the violence of states. She also directly addresses the reasons why political actors in pursuit of freedom may be unable to settle the question of the justifiability of violence a priori, either by reference to determinate, permissive, or prohibitive criteria, or by outlawing it altogether. in what follows, i argue that Beauvoir's ethics of ambiguity offers important insights into the persuasiveness of "realistic and positive" and "idealistic and moral" arguments that justify the use of violence in politics, from a revolutionary as well as from a statist perspective (111). these insights draw our attention to the conditions of possibility underpinning positions on the legitimacy of political violence that range from the "necessity" arguments of realpolitik to moral justifications. Her ethics of ambiguity suggests that the question of an adequate ethical response to political violence cannot be settled in principle. Her approach does not offer a recipe for determining the legitimacy or otherwise of the use of violence in politics in general, whether state sanctioned or not; rather, it illuminates the irremediable difficulty and inescapability of such judgments in a violent but also intransigent world. Before moving on to look at Beauvoir's argument in detail, it is necessary to put the turn to Beauvoir into context.
Feminism, Political Violence, and Beauvoir
As feminists we abhor the idea of war and violence, which causes and leads to the subjugation of a large mass of people and domination by the few. (Pande in Alloo et al. 2002, 97) i used to like a yellow ochre poster with a profile of che guevara and his saying: "let me, at the risk of seeming ridiculous, say that true revolutionaries are motivated by feelings of love." i feel more ambivalent about even his revolutionary violence, his political certainty, as i grow older. (Sreberny in Alloo et al. 2002, 104) these two quotations are taken from "the Events of 11 September and Beyond," a forum that appeared in the International Feminist Journal of Politics in spring 2002 (Alloo et al. 2002) . the forum was one example of a range of commentary, response, and analysis that has appeared in feminist publications following the September 11 attacks and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and iraq (see also tickner 2002; Bar roundtable 2002; gunew 2003; young 2003) . A key theme in this literature has been the feminist critique of the political (imperialist and patriarchal) violence of the state, both internally and externally directed. Almost as one, feminists from different parts of the world have condemned the hypocrisy of the Bush administration's use of the rhetoric of women's rights to help justify the invasion of Afghanistan. Almost as one, feminists from different parts of the world have condemned the united States and allied powers for their invasions of Afghanistan and iraq, and for the conduct of the "war on terror" on the home front. 4 However, although there has been a high degree of consensus across the feminist movement in response to 9/11 and its aftermath, a closer look at the literature it has inspired draws attention to a degree of ambivalence on the broader question of the possibility of justifying political violence from a feminist point of view.
Within this literature, some of the arguments reflect the attitude that the grounds on which feminists make judgments about the ethics of violence pertain to the manner in which the violence is deployed, by whom, and for what purposes. thus, we find violence condemned because it is being used by powerful actors against the weak. We find violence condemned because it is being used indiscriminately, against innocents, both by the 9/11 bombers and the united States and its allies. And we find violence condemned because it is being deployed for unjust (antifeminist) ends, such as the consolidation of patriarchal or hegemonic global power. in contrast, other arguments reflect the second attitude, in which violence is condemned because it is an instance of violence in general, and violence in general works against feminist values and feminist goals. thus we find arguments that women always suffer disproportionately from the effects of political violence, that violence always breeds more violence, and that the use of violence as such reproduces masculinist subjectivities and values.
these different threads of argument may all work toward the same conclusion about 9/11 and beyond, but they do so in rather different ways. the first kind of argument keeps the question of political violence open for feminists because it allows for the possibility of a different kind of judgment in circumstances in which the weak use violence against the strong or in which discrimination continues to occur, and as a means to further freedom and justice. the second kind of argument closes down the question of political violence for feminism by ruling out any possible circumstance in which it might be justified. the ambiguity of feminist responses to 9/11 and its aftermath testifies to long-standing opposition within feminism between the push to keep the question of political violence open and the push to close it down. the persistence of this contradictory dynamic is evident even in the work of feminists strongly committed to nonviolence, as exemplified, for instance, by Sara ruddick.
in her book Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (1989) , ruddick famously argues for a nonviolent ethics grounded in the virtues inherent in mothering. She develops an ethical critique not only of militarism but also of just-war theory. For ruddick, political violence is not only antithetical to feminist values, but also produces and reproduces gendered relations of power. nevertheless, even though her whole analysis is geared toward the condemnation of violence as a political instrument, her argument stops short of absolute pacifism.
Although pacifists perform an essential service among peace activists by requiring every act of violence to be critically appraised, it is unnecessary and divisive to require of all peacemakers an absolute commitment not to kill. nor does a sturdy suspicion of violence require self-righteous condemnation of others' violent acts or a prizing of violence from historical situations such as in nazi germany or South Africa today. (138) ruddick's argument illustrates the ongoing tension between feminist distrust of political violence and the conviction that in circumstances of oppression, the use of political violence may be a necessary evil. in effect, ruddick is saying that the question of the possibility of a trade-off between violent means and antioppressive ends cannot be fully settled. to use violence, even against oppression, is to contravene the values of care inherent in ruddick's maternal ethic and to risk reproducing the conditions that feminism seeks to contest. But to abjure violence altogether is to risk being unable to challenge the violence that also contravenes those values and reproduces those conditions. ruddick's argument confirms the dilemmas feminists face in the judgment of political violence, but it doesn't resolve them. For some feminists, both pacifist and nonpacifist, this represents an evasion of the question of political violence. Does feminism anywhere offer a theory/philosophy of "its own" that presents arguments on deaths, on killing (which) people in which kinds of modern and postmodern wars? Or is the question unfeminist and therefore always already verboten? (Sylvester in Alloo et al. 2002, 108) christine Sylvester's question strikes a somewhat discordant note among a series of contributions to the 2002 forum that are mostly concerned with analyzing and condemning both the 9/11 attacks and the u.S. response to them on feminist grounds. it is a question that jerks the discussion from the consideration of a particular case and demands that feminism provides some response in general to the question of what kinds of trade-off between death and injury and feminist political goals might be considered acceptable in the contemporary world. contrary to Sylvester's implication, there is, of course, an existing body of literature in which feminists have sought to respond precisely to this question. 5 For the purposes of this essay, it isn't possible to do justice to the range and sophistication of this work. However, within it, we again find two broad strands of argument that link to the two feminist attitudes to violence sketched above. One strand argues that a trade-off between the negative effects of violence and the positive goals that that violence would achieve may be possible in certain circumstances; the other argues that no such trade-off is possible. the trade-off position is exemplified in feminist attempts to adapt the framework of just-war theory, which seeks to enable ethical discrimination among violence perpetrated on feminist grounds (Peach 1994) . the impossibility of a trade-off position is exemplified in arguments for feminist pacifism, which commit feminism to the renunciation of violence as a political tool (carroll 1987) . i want to suggest, however, that Sylvester's recent call for feminism to settle the question of political violence, and the attempts both nonpacifist and pacifist feminist thinkers have already made to settle the question, underestimate the ethical significance of the ambiguity that works through so much feminist argument on the subject of political violence. rather than trying to erase ambiguity from the feminist response to political violence, we should try to understand and work with it. it is here that Beauvoir's ethics of ambiguity becomes a valuable resource for feminism. Although Beauvoir's work is foundational for contemporary feminist philosophy, it has not played a significant part in contemporary debates on the feminist ethics of political violence. this is partly because the question of political violence is not central to Beauvoir's ethics as it is developed in The Second Sex (1949 Sex ( /1997 .
6 the potential usefulness of Beauvoir's work for feminist debates on the ethics of violence has also gone unrecognized because the work in which she does address the question of violence in politics has normally been interpreted as existentialist rather than feminist. The Ethics of Hypatia Ambiguity, which was published just before The Second Sex, is not framed in terms of feminism or gender or sexual difference, and for many readers has been effectively dismissed as an exemplar of a derivative, Sartrean ethics. i would suggest, however, that there are good reasons for reconsidering the neglect of Beauvoir's work as a resource for a feminist ethics of political violence. recent scholarship on Beauvoir has opened up the question of the relationships among her arguments in The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex. Although The Ethics of Ambiguity is not an explicitly feminist text, it is by no means clear that this makes it irrelevant to feminist ethics or entirely distinct from the lines of argument Beauvoir develops in The Second Sex.
7 moreover, what we have in The Ethics of Ambiguity is a feminist thinker engaging directly with the task of thinking about the ethics of political violence, from a point of view that takes both the existence of oppression and the necessity of the struggle against that oppression as its starting point.
Justifying Political Violence two aspects of the context of The Ethics of Ambiguity are important for understanding the nature of its argument. First is its philosophical context. Within the text, Beauvoir is clearly seeking to address the implications of Sartrean existentialism for ethics. Second is its political-ideological context. the aftermath of World War ii and the beginning of the cold War was a time in which arguments over the justifiability of revolutionary or resistant violence were particularly pertinent for the French left, given revelations about the Soviet regime, emerging anticolonial struggles, and the recent experience of occupation and resistance. Beauvoir's argument is self-consciously situated in a tradition of justifying violence against oppression, and draws on marxist-syndicalist ideas. in this respect, the text harks back to the earlier work of georges Sorel's Reflections on Violence (1908 Violence ( /1999 , is a companion piece to maurice merleau-Ponty's roughly contemporary Humanism and Terror (1947/1969) , and looks forward to Frantz Fanon's work and Jean-Paul Sartre's preface to Fanon's Wretched of the Earth (1963) . in my reading of The Ethics of Ambiguity, i will suggest that the value of the text resides, first, in the ways in which Beauvoir's argument exposes problems with the assumptions about action and violence that enable the justification of political violence from existentialist and syndicalist viewpoints, both separately and together. Second, the value of the text resides in Beauvoir's attempt to rethink the question of the legitimacy of political violence, once the assumptions of existentialism and syndicalism are challenged, from the point of view of ambiguity.
in The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir introduces her argument as a defense of existentialist ethics against a variety of alternatives. the first half of the text focuses on classifying and evaluating the different ways in which people live out their response to the human condition. the second half of the text concentrates more concretely on exploring questions of the ethics of political action, including a specific focus on the question of whether and how the use of violence in politics might be permissible. She begins by setting up the context of ethics, the nature of the human condition, on orthodox existentialist lines. Human individuals, on this account, are fundamentally defined by their freedom. Freedom is identified in terms of an inescapable project of transcendence, which follows from the impossibility of identifying human existence with any given essence. this means that the idea of choice is fundamental to human being in the world, and ethics is embedded in the necessity of choice and the projects inherent in different choices (Beauvoir 1948 (Beauvoir /1997 . in order to act at all, existents necessarily objectify and make use of both the world (material and social) and other existents. According to the existentialist view of humanity, the clash of projects as human beings seek, but inevitably fail, to realize themselves in the world may always take on a zero-sum form (113, 118) . For this reason, Beauvoir does not see a possible future in which life ceases to be structured in agonistic terms, although her argument makes clear that this agonism need neither prohibit cooperation nor take on a violent form. Violence enters into the equation with the ever-present possibility of individuals' falling into the trap of "seriousness."
Beauvoir classifies different kinds of lived response to the human condition into a set of ideal types. Of these types, the "serious man" represents one inappropriate and therefore also ethically unacceptable type (35). the fundamental mistake of the serious man is that he identifies himself with particular ends and values in an unquestioning and absolute way. From here, it is a short step to treating the world and other existents solely as either help or hindrance to his projects (102). Although it is possible for the serious man to engage with the world and others productively, insofar as his projects pursue the ends of justice and freedom, nevertheless his is an ethically dangerous character. For the serious man, the value of his ends is always already known to outweigh the costs inherent in the means he uses. the serious man is not necessarily a tyrant in Beauvoir's view, but he may easily become one. For the tyrant, the world and others are simply grist to the mill of his own desires, and the injury and death of other existents is only meaningful in terms of how well the tyrant's desires are fulfilled through that injury and death. For Beauvoir, this instrumentalization of others is the defining mark of oppressive violence. this kind of violence manifests both in the killing and injury of others and, more broadly, in all of the ways in which humans may be objectified and used, through conditioning or constraint. in existentialist terms, the violence of the tyrant is archetypically unjustifiable, since it is grounded on the refusal of the truth of the human condition, reducing others to a thing-like status, solely for the purposes of enhancing the tyrant's power.
Hypatia
Beauvoir's argument is couched in the individualist terms of existentialism, but, as mentioned above, her discussion of oppressive violence also draws on the marxist-syndicalist ideas Sorel pioneered a generation earlier (1908/1999 ). Sorel's developed his arguments from an unorthodox version of marxism, in which class war is understood as the essential truth of capitalist society. Sorel claimed that violence is an inevitable consequence of the zero-sum relation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, whose interests are represented by the state. For Sorel, oppressive violence was exemplified by the Jacobin revolutionary terror (101, 108). this was violence in juridical guise, supported by secret police and show trials, in which the powerful victimized the powerless (105). in contrast, proletarian violence, exemplified by the general strike, manifests a sublime and heroic ethic, oriented toward equality and freedom. Sorel stressed the necessity of resistant violence as a response to the violence of the bourgeois state. Such violence is necessary primarily because there simply is no other way to change the world. For Sorel, to deny the need for resistant, proletarian violence was to connive with the politico-criminal classes in their desire to mystify the workers into accepting their ongoing defeat at the hands of the bourgeoisie. in a situation in which one is under attack, repudiation of violence can equal surrender, which means accepting a radically exploitative and unequal society and abandoning socialist aspirations toward equality and freedom. Because violence is already endemic, there is no choice between violence and nonviolence; instead, there is the need to discriminate between different types of violence, or at least to establish what kind of violence is positive in its effects.
When Beauvoir claims that "revolt" is the only option for the tyrant's victims, and that revolt will take the form of resistant violence (1948/1997, 82, 84) , she moves from the individualist terrain of existentialist analysis to the collectivist analysis of syndicalism. While existentialism presents violence as an ever-present danger in the relation of existents to the world and to others, the syndicalist argument insists on the ways in which violence is structurally embedded in oppressive social and political relations (Beauvoir 1948 (Beauvoir /1997 . the emphasis of existentialism is on choice and possibility and that of syndicalism is on necessity. Beauvoir's argument brings these two ways of thinking together in setting up her argument, even though there are clearly tensions between them. in doing this, she establishes the question of the ethics of resistant political violence as something that must be taken seriously.
From both existentialist and syndicalist points of view, the violence of the politically powerful, most obviously concentrated in the regimes in control of the apparatus of state power, is to be condemned. From both points of view, therefore, the question of whether such violence should be violently resisted has to be asked. the question that the reader of The Ethics of Ambiguity must ask is the extent to which Beauvoir endorsed the arguments that she used in order to pose the question of the ethics of resistant violence. this is not an easy question to answer. it is possible to read her argument, along the lines of merleau-Ponty's Humanism and Terror (1969) or Sartre's preface to Fanon's Wretched of the Earth (Fanon 1963) , which also combine existentialist and syndicalist elements, as a straightforward defense of violence as a necessary instrument in the battle against oppression.
8 this seems to follow from both the existentialist and syndicalist strands in her argument. Existentialism stresses the inherent agonism of the human condition and the tendency for existents to lapse into seriousness and tyranny; syndicalism stresses the inevitability of a politically violent response to violent political oppression.
Beauvoir appears to endorse the legitimacy of such violence unambiguously when she says, "the fact is that one finds himself forced to treat certain men as things in order to win the freedom of all. . . . A freedom which is occupied in denying freedom is itself so outrageous that the outrageousness of the violence which one practices against it is almost cancelled out" (1948/1997, 97) . However, on examination, it becomes apparent that Beauvoir's argument is not so straightforward. On the one hand, the text can be interpreted as affirming the necessity of violence. On the other hand, it can be interpreted as demonstrating that "realistic and positive" and "idealistic and moral" vocabularies for understanding and legitimizing violence are both mistaken and unethical, and indeed that they are unethical because they are mistaken (111).
Beauvoir initially seems committed to the claim that violence in resistance to oppression is both necessary and legitimate. necessary, because those reduced to thing-like status by oppression will react against this denial of their existential condition, and this is not possible without the use of violence. legitimate, because the ultimate wrong is oppression and to act to increase freedom must be a good thing. However, as soon as Beauvoir has made these claims, she immediately qualifies them, noting that the fight against oppression may often involve (and may have to involve) violence against those who are not directly responsible for oppression, and raises the problem that the outrage of oppressive violence spawns equally outrageous violence in reaction (98). Even at a cursory glance, therefore, she notes that there are dilemmas inherent in embracing the use of violence when one is fighting oppression. this is most obvious in the way that resistant political violence mirrors oppressive violence in its instrumentalization of others: "We are obliged to destroy not only the oppressor but also those who serve him, whether they do so out of ignorance or out of constraint" (98). in examining such dilemmas further, Beauvoir explores a variety of arguments that might be used to justify such violence.
She begins with the argument from necessity, which she identifies with marxist historical materialism in which revolutionary violence is justified simply because it is how history is able to make progress. On this account, individuals are the bearers of antagonistic social relations that erupt into violence and thereby enable revolutionary change (109). For Beauvoir, however, the argument from fatality simply doesn't work, since it requires the absence of both thought and error on the part of those directing and perpetrating such revolutionary violence. in other words, it rests on assumptions that contradict the existentialist account of the human condition. Because of this, in order to accept the "doctrine of necessity," people must be persuaded that they cannot think or make mistakes, a denial of subjectivity that may not physically kill the subject, but which nevertheless effectively reduces him or her to the status of a thing: "in order to mask the violence, what they do is to have recourse to a new violence which even invades his mind" (110). necessity arguments both contradict the reality of the human condition and have oppressive political implications. However, Beauvoir points out, even where the necessity argument is rejected, those committed to revolutionary social transformation will argue that resistant violence, and even the myth of its necessity, may still be justified in instrumental, utility-based terms. "From conservatives to revolutionaries, through idealistic and moral vocabularies or realistic and positive ones, the outrageousness of violence is excused in the name of utility" (111).
the first problem that Beauvoir identifies with utility-based justifications of political violence is the meaning of utility itself. What counts as "useful" will differ from one actor and one context to another. moreover, any account of utility that is cashed out in terms other than enhancing freedom poses problems from an existentialist point of view. She suggests, therefore, that the key to justifying political violence is the extent to which violence serves freedom. However, a set of further difficulties emerges once this is established. Since we are engaged in a trade-off between these persons' freedoms in exchange for the freedoms of others, how do we make the calculation (113)? Beauvoir suggests that neither quantitative nor qualitative measures are adequate. On the one hand, it is impossible to quantify freedom; on the other hand, a judgment that gives infinite value to freedom (as in certain Kantian views on autonomy) ends up in the absurdity of refusing to weigh the freedom of one against that of ten thousand (114). Beauvoir suggests that the only way of using freedom as a criterion for assessing the legitimacy of political violence is by judging whether that violence opens up or closes down freedom for the future (115-16).
At this point, Beauvoir identifies further, more profound problems with instrumental justifications of resistant political violence, whether from existentialist or syndicalist perspectives. Even if it can be agreed that freedom is the political goal at which we aim, we cannot know that this aim will be achieved. instrumental arguments assume a highly questionable series of things about agency. in particular, they make assumptions about the relation between the agent and the world in which she acts and about the relationship between the means and ends of action. instrumental arguments assume a high level of independence and foresight in the political actor. On this account, the revolutionary agent is capable of detaching herself from her environment and acting upon it as an external force, predicting what the impact of that action will be. As Beauvoir points out, we do not know the future, our information is always partial and imperfect, and our control of events is limited. Agents do not act in a vacuum, and all actions have unintended consequences (115-28).
moreover, a thinking that assumes the possibility of a trade-off between present sacrifice and future freedom is also committed to the idea that one can maintain a clear distinction between the means and ends of action. Beauvoir argues that such a distinction cannot be maintained and that in the case of political violence, means frequently contradict or corrupt ends. it isn't possible, she argues, to exclude the means from the ethical meaning of the act. to exemplify this, she refers to the cold War attitudes of both Britain and the uSSr and the ways in which the means (supporting authoritarian regimes in the former case, aggrandizing Soviet power in the latter) encroached on and corrupted the ends (defending civilization and democracy and the liberation of the proletariat, respectively) of these states. in the first case, there was an immediate contradiction between means and ends; in the second, the end was so mythical and distant that it had ceased to have any meaning, and the means had effectively taken over as the end (124-25).
Beauvoir's attempt to establish what counts as justifiable violence appears to run out of steam at this point. She has pointed out flaws in a range of ways in which revolutionary or resistant violence is justified. in addition, she has criticized two key assumptions on which all those justifying such violence, in relation to whatever ethical framework, rely: our capacity to control the outcomes of our actions, and the possibility of drawing a clear distinction between means and ends. nevertheless, her argument does not end here. "the present sacrifices and failures no longer seem compensated for in any point in time. And utility can no longer be defined absolutely. thus, are we not ending by condemning action as criminal and absurd though at the same time condemning man to action?" (128). the problem, argues Beauvoir, is that action is, of necessity, future oriented. moreover, political action oriented to the ending of oppression is, of necessity, oriented toward a future in the long term. if we dismiss the possibility of trade-off between long-term ends and immediate means, for the reasons she has outlined, then we are in danger of undermining the fight against oppression altogether. the lack of certainty in the outcomes of our actions, Beauvoir argues, cannot absolve us of the responsibility to keep the options for action open. this means that although we can dismiss the possibility of justifying political violence on the basis of confident expectations of the future, we cannot dismiss it solely on the basis of our uncertainty. the condition of political action, she argues, is not absurdity, but ambiguity, and on this basis, she claims that the question of the legitimacy of political violence remains open. two examples discussed in the text illustrate the reasons why. the first is a contrast between negative and positive action against oppression . the second is a contrast between racist lynching, on the one hand, and Stalinist liquidation of political opponents, on the other (145).
Beauvoir's key example of negative action against oppression is the refusal to give up a communist member of the French resistance to the nazi administration (131). Beauvoir presents this refusal to betray resistance fighters, even at the cost of other lives, as a purely moral act. the moral status of this act rests, in her view, on the exact fit between the means and ends of the action, both of which affirm freedom without conditions. Beauvoir argues, however, that this moral purity derives from its negativity (it is fundamentally reactive) and from the narrow constraints on the choice involved. in such circumstances, both the ethical stakes and the consequences of the choice being made are unusually clear; the responsibility for violence also is clearly in the hands of the oppressor. this is contrasted with the ethics of "positive" action, by which Beauvoir means the construction of alternatives to oppressive conditions. Here, she argues, purity is impossible to maintain and violence and failure haunt all action (132). it is haunted by violence partly because the situation of oppression is always already violent, and responses to it will be affected by that violence. in addition, however, the presence of violence as one of the instruments in the repertoire of oppression means that it cannot be simply ignored, it is already on the political agenda, to be chosen or rejected. Because no actor controls the outcomes of his or her actions, there are therefore no guarantees that the ends pursued will be achieved by the chosen means. Beauvoir suggests, therefore, that if one is to do more than react to the demands of the oppressor, whether heroically or otherwise, then the question of the justifiability of violence will persist, even if it can never be settled.
Beauvoir's contrast between racist lynching and Stalinist purges is used, in the same way as the contrast between negative and positive responses to oppression, to underline the ethical significance of ambiguity. "lynching is an absolute evil; it represents the survival of an obsolete civilization, the perpetuation of a struggle of races which has to disappear; it is a fault without justification or excuse. Suppressing a hundred opponents is surely an outrage, but it may have meaning and a reason" (146). Beauvoir's claim is that the ends of the racist killer are premised on a complete denial of the truth of the human condition (that is, existents are incapable of being essentialized). For this reason, there can be no starting point for justification, just as there is no starting point for condemnation in the case of refusing to give up the resistance fighter to the nazi regime. in contrast, the liquidation of opponents to a political regime with ends compatible with human freedom is ambiguous in its meaning, it might be justifiable, and there is at least some kind of argument to be had in this context. She points out that the arguments offered in defense of its political violence by the Stalinist regime are not convincing, for the range of reasons already discussed. they are premised on the denial of ambiguity bound up in arguments as to the necessity and unproblematic instrumentality of violence. Beauvoir then outlines how the revolutionary could approach the use of violence as a political instrument in an ethical way. the key to the justifiability of any such violence is not that there is no "sacrifice," but that the actor is fully reflexive about his or her action and does not assume this violence lightly (133). this reflexivity involves both careful consideration of the likelihood of ends being achieved and of the costs involved, but also recognition that all action is risky and no such calculation secure.
if he considers his enterprise in its truth, that is, in its finiteness, he will understand that he has never anything but a finite stake to oppose to the sacrifices which he calls for, and that it is an uncertain stake. Of course, this uncertainty should not keep him from pursuing his goals; but it requires that one concern himself in each case with finding a balance between the goals and the means. (148) With this passage, Beauvoir's argument appears to have come full circle. Having begun by raising a whole series of problems with the assumptions underpinning the arguments of those using violence in the name of freedom, she ends up with the familiar metaphor of "balancing" the goals of action against the means used to attain them. the ethics of ambiguity seems to take us no further than the existentialist or syndicalist justification of resistant political violence with which Beauvoir began. i believe, however, that this is not necessarily the case.
Ethics of Ambiguity
According to existentialism, humanity is a project of transcendence, a negativity that perpetually thwarts attempts to essentialize the meaning of any individual human existence, whether in terms of social class, moral ideals, or religious faith. According to syndicalism, the violence of oppression is necessarily countered by a resistant violence, without which social transformation would be impossible. it is not difficult to read Beauvoir's ethics as a straightforward development of these two positions. When the subject is presented as pure transcendence, then the challenge to this transcendence is easily identified as the ultimate wrong, and as prima facie legitimation for an in-kind response. the kind of moral subjectivity invoked here is reminiscent of the Kantian account. And the ethics to which it gives rise reflects the version of the categorical imperative wherein treating any person as a "mere means" violates the requirements of pure practical reason, which are grounded in the unique value inherent in human autonomy (Kant 1969, 195) . One confirmation of a neo-Kantian reading is Beauvoir's use of the example, discussed above, of the refusal to give up names of resistance fighters to the authorities, even to save the lives of others (1948/1997, 131) . Such an act, she claims, is purely moral, in that it is an unconditional rejection of oppression and affirms the absolute value of human existence. it appears that in this case the moral subject has the ability to protect itself from contamination by political violence, even as its actions imply violence. Similarly, Beauvoir's insistence on the inevitability of violence as a response to oppression seems to fit exactly with Sorel's insistence on the inevitability of class struggle. this very necessity then carries with it the need to identify the grounds of discrimination between oppressive and antioppressive violence.
However, even as Beauvoir offers an account that is apparently in keeping both with the idea of an autonomous moral subject and with a leftist tradition of defending resistant violence, she is also offering a different message. Along with the existentialist view of the moral subject as pure transcendence, Beauvoir repeatedly insists in her analysis on the relevance and inescapability of the relationships among transcendent subjects, the material and social world, and other existents (71, 81). Along with the syndicalist view of violence as a necessary instrument for progress, Beauvoir repeatedly criticizes both arguments from necessity and the relationships among actor, means, and ends presumed by instrumental reasoning. All the way through her text, her defense of revolutionary violence is subverted by her deconstruction of the assumptions on which this defense is based. the key to the subversive message of Beauvoir's text is her replacement of transcendence as the heart of moral agency with the concept of ambiguity. "let us try to assume our fundamental ambiguity. it is in the knowledge of the genuine conditions of our life that we must draw our strength to live and our reason for acting" (9).
in the course of her discussion, Beauvoir identifies a range of ways in which human existence is ambiguous. these ambiguities ultimately refer back to the ways in which to be human is both to be and not to be subject (autonomous agency) and to be and not to be situation (identifiable with both the world and others). this ambiguity is illustrated early on in her argument when she introduces the figure of the woman in the harem to demonstrate how agency is structured and constrained by situation (38). this suggests a different way of understanding the nature of the "wrong" involved in oppression. Here, the wrong lies not in the reduction of the other to "thing" as such, but in the denial of the "ambiguity" of both subject and other. tyrants are defined not simply by the fact that they instrumentalize others (this will also be something done by liberators, as Beauvoir makes clear [1948/1997, 98, 155] ). tyrants also are defined by their identification of themselves with pure transcendence, a refusal to "assume" their own ambiguity (102). in the case of both the tyrant and the serious man, Beauvoir identifies the unethical with the subject who understands himself or herself as such.
in the case of the tyrant, decision making becomes a technical rather than an ethical matter. to assume pure transcendence is to assume that the world and others exist to furnish the tyrant's desires, and that the tyrant has the capacity to exert control over the world, others, and therefore the future (102). the serious man is different from the tyrant in that he is committed not simply to the confirmation of his own transcendence but to particular ends and values that he knows to be right. However, this moral certainty is lived in a way that mimics the tyrant's conviction as to his own transcendence, in that it legitimates the instrumentalization of the world and others to whatever higher cause is in question. in its denial of ambiguity, the perspective of the serious man does not allow means to be put into question in relation to ends, and again reduces moral and political judgment to an essentially technical exercise. this does not mean that what the serious man accomplishes is always and inevitably wrong; unlike the tyrant, the ends of the serious man may be ones that will open up possibilities for others. But insofar as the serious man acts as if he possesses the key to pure transcendence, then he fails to recognize the dangers inherent in his action and is therefore inherently more dangerous than one who acts on the assumption of ambiguity (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) .
in the light of her stress on the significance of ambiguity, Beauvoir's treatment of the example of a purely moral act given above can be interpreted as implying something other than the endorsement of an ideal of moral purity. Beauvoir makes clear that not only is the negative moment of resistance morally pure but also that it is in some sense "easy," since it reflects a situation in which there is only one possibility at hand that affirms the ambiguity of the human condition-the utter rejection of a way of life (nazism) premised on a rejection of that ambiguity (132). this reference to the easiness of moral judgment and action in a case of pure negation gains a rather different meaning when put in the context of her stress, elsewhere in the text, on the idea of difficulty as the key mark of an ethics of ambiguity (154). Although it is clear that she is not dismissing the moral status of such heroic acts of pure negation, she is suggesting that they do not tell us very much about ethics, including the ethics of political violence, outside of extreme and highly structured situations: "Political choice is an ethical choice: it is a wager as well as a decision" (148). But in the case of the refusal to collaborate, there is no wager, outcomes are clearly defined, and the sense of the act is confined to a confirmation of ambiguity as the human condition, with little significance beyond the existential.
Beauvoir's argument is that insofar as ambiguity is denied, then so is ethics. Her point is that once you have certainty then you move from the ground of ethics to the ground of calculation. Ethics, in contrast, is grounded in uncertainty, both at the level of who moral agents are and what moral agents know about themselves and about the outcomes of their actions. this argument undercuts the instrumental morality of revolutionary violence offered by syndicalism as much as it undercuts the existentialist emphasis on transcendence as the defining mark of the human condition.
in order for the return to the positive to be genuine it must involve negativity, it must not conceal the antinomies between means and end, present and future; they must be lived in a permanent tension; one must retreat from neither the outrage of violence nor deny it, or, which amounts to the same thing, assume it lightly. (133) Violence is assumed lightly when it is claimed to be necessary or effective as a matter of course. necessity arguments rest on either of two claims. the first is that violence is simply endemic in human relations. this argument, however, undermines ambiguity by putting violence definitively beyond human control, making it more like a material force, which in being directed against one target, engenders an equal and opposite reaction. the second is that violence is the only way in which certain ends can be achieved. this tack equally undermines ambiguity by suggesting that we possess levels of certainty about what will and will not work as a political instrument, which would require a godlike transcendence of the mess and complexity of the human condition. Similarly, the idea that violence will be effective in the cause of liberation entails a set of assumptions that defies ambiguity. Such claims rely not only on the possibility of our knowing that identified ends will be (or are at least likely to be) achievable through violence. they also rely on conceiving of agent, violence, and outcome as mutually uncontaminating moments in a sequence of action. in contrast, the assumption of ambiguity undermines the separateness of agent from instrument and instrument from ends. From this perspective, agents are not self-legislating, and violence is not a self-subsistent entity that can be picked up and dropped like a tool, or channeled and diverted like a river. instead, agency and violence, as with all other modes and means of action, are caught in mutually constitutive relations. Similarly, the means by which action is carried out affect, but do not control, the ends to which they are directed; ends and means are part and parcel of each other.
the message of The Ethics of Ambiguity is a deeply ambivalent one. On the one hand, Beauvoir has offered us an ethics of justified violence grounded in an understanding of the moral subject as a being who may (rightfully) use violence as a tool to defeat violence, within the context of a radically oppressive world. On the other hand, she has offered us an ethics of ambiguity in which the moral subject's endorsement of the use of violence is linked to a fundamental misunderstanding of his or her own ambiguous nature. On the view that violence can be justified, action is a matter of calculation; on the ambiguity view, action is a gamble. For the serious man, the relationship between agency and violence is straightforward. the agent is a wholly different species of being from the tools he employs and cannot be corrupted by them as long as his ends are just. For the ambiguous moral agent, the relationship between subjectivity and violence is more puzzling, since not only is the effectiveness of violence as an instrument put into question but also the fantasy of a subjectivity that in seeing itself as controlling violence effectively models itself on violence as the power of pure objectification.
So does the critique of violence from the standpoint of ambiguity entail the rejection of violence as a political instrument, even in the struggle against oppression? Beauvoir's answer to this is no. For her, the pacifist is an incarnation of the serious man who is grounded in the denial of ambiguity as the condition of moral agency. this denial makes moral judgment and action easy in a manner reminiscent of the misleading purity of negative morality. For Beauvoir, ruling out political violence a priori is as dangerous as the tyrant's or syndicalist's willingness to embrace violence as the key to the future. this is because pacifism removes the need for the moral agent to think about herself and her actions, when confronted by the question of violence within specific contexts. in particular, it removes the possibility of recognizing that violence is not an external otherness to be transcended, whether in the form of repudiation or control, but a set of practices internal to who human beings are and how they relate to one another. this means that the refusal of violence may, sometimes, only be able to take the form of violence.
Just as subjectivity is not pure transcendence, so violence is not some occult force, to be channeled, controlled, or avoided. rather, violence is a practice, a mode of being in the world that rests, as does subjectivity, on complex conditions of possibility. An ethics of ambiguity requires subjects to think about violence as rooted in the world and in subjects, as a mode of action uncertain in its intended effects, and as confirming and producing subjects and worlds, even as it is produced by them. Such an ethics cannot be linked simply to any ethical framework that has the criteria, permissive or prohibitive, for weighing the legitimacy of violence worked out in advance.
We can accuse Beauvoir of forwarding in The Ethics of Ambiguity a kind of revolutionary utilitarianism in which justification for the use of political violence in the pursuit of certain kinds of ends is offered. in contrast to such a reading, i have suggested that Beauvoir was saying something different. through her exploration of the denial of ambiguity in the violence of the tyrant and the serious man, she pushes readers to think about both agency and violence in ways that unravel the assumptions on which abstract and general arguments for both the legitimation and prohibition of violence rest. there are ways of thinking about violence that render it "easy." this is obvious in the case of the tyrant, and more generally in the case of any oppressive system in which the inferior worth or entitlement of some as opposed to others is assumed. After all, if i know that X is worth less than y, then the sacrifice of X in the cause of y follows from a straightforward cost/benefit analysis. A less obvious, but still comparatively "easy" violence is that of the serious man struggling against oppression, whose privileged insight into what's good or true enables action with good conscience, even when this involves the sacrifice of others or outcomes that accord ill with the original intention. Beauvoir's ethics offers an argument against the idea of privileged moral certainty located within subjects that makes violence easy, as men's violence against women has been made easy by the assumption of male superiority. But she equally sets her face against the standpoint of the pacifist, who, in abjuring violence absolutely, disavows her own entanglement with it. But if Beauvoir rejects presumptions that underpin arguments for both antioppressive violence, on the one hand, and pacifism, on the other, then where does this leave the feminist grappling with how to respond ethically and politically to the question of violence in politics?
the initial and apparently unsatisfactory response to the question of where Beauvoir leaves us is that she leaves us in difficulty, since she has deprived us of sources of moral authority capable of legitimating or prohibiting violence by establishing guidelines on killing of the kind Sylvester calls for. Beauvoir insists that we deconstruct the conditions of possibility of the question, is it legitimate to use violence in such and such a case? Posing the question presumes violence is an instrument that a subject (individual or collective) may use to bring about certain ends. But Beauvoir demonstrates that this set of presumptions is highly questionable. Beauvoir's answer to the difficulty of making judgments about violence is to call for reflexivity about the interrelation between agency and violence, and the means and ends of violent action. Such reflexivity makes us think not only about the trade-off between the means and ends of violence, including the "collateral damage" that violence may inflict on individual perpetrators and victims, but also about a range of other factors. these include the extraordinary ideological and institutional investment required to sustain violence as a mode of lived subjectivity, the potential for corruption of ends by means, and our lack of control over the outcomes of our actions.
ultimately, Beauvoir's argument suggests that there is no stable resolution to the ambiguity in feminist responses to political violence, which i traced at the outset of this essay. On the one hand, she offers considerable support to those arguing that the question of the justification of resistant violence cannot be settled by reference to a trade-off between violent means and ethical ends. On the other hand, she argues that to close down the question of the justifiability of violence by adopting a pacifist position is ethically dangerous, because it removes the moral agent from the complexity of context just as effectively as those arguments that believe the issue can be settled by the use of determinate criteria. these arguments, however, are not inconsistent. they suggest, paradoxically, that once ambiguity is assumed, the arguments against using violence become stronger, but it becomes more difficult to outlaw the legitimacy of violence in advance. We have been given a more comprehensive sense of what is at stake in arguments surrounding political violence, the kinds of factors on which we need to reflect, and the kinds of mistakes it is all too easy to make. But at the same time, we are left with the responsibility of judgment in the absence of vocabularies of necessity, moral authority, or the reliability of instrumental reason. notes increasingly insisting that to read Beauvoir in terms of liberalism or essentialism, justice or care, gender or sexual difference may be to fail to do justice to her work. these interpreters urge us to read with the multiple ambiguities of Beauvoir's analysis rather than to evade or try to settle them (Kruks 2001; Bauer 2001; Heinämaa 2003; gatens 2003) . this approach cautions against taking for granted the ways in which Beauvoir's arguments will fit with contemporary debate and has encouraged revisiting her texts with a more open mind.
See Bauer 2001 and Hutchings 2003 for more extensive expositions of the 7. relationship between The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex.
As with the reading of Beauvoir offered in this article, it is possible to contest 8. the reading of merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Fanon in terms of a mix of existentialism and syndicalism. However, the view that these thinkers offer justification for collective violence in pursuit of revolutionary ends is a plausible one, and my purpose here is to use that position as a foil for the alternative argument that emerges in The Ethics of Ambiguity. For a useful comparison of Beauvoir and merleau-Ponty on ambiguity, see langer 2003. references
